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For the Barack Obama Administration, addressing cli-mate change has quickly risen as a priority . How the Administration should address climate change, how-
ever, remains very much in question . The U .S . Congress has 
started to move on climate legislation, but assuming passage, 
the final shape and detail of these efforts may not be known 
for months or even years . In the meantime, the Clean Air Act 
(CAA)1—a complex legal framework with many regulatory 
hooks and levers—remains the law of the land .
In light of the CAA’s central role in addressing climate 
change over at least the near term, and perhaps far longer, 
on March 26, 2009, a group of the nation’s leading CAA 
experts gathered at Duke University to focus specifically 
on how the U .S . Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
could or should use the CAA to reduce the nation’s green-
house gases (GHGs) . Cosponsored by the Nicholas Institute 
for Environmental Policy Solutions at Duke University, the 
Duke Law School, and the Harvard Law School, the con-
ference was organized with robust participation from EPA . 
To ensure that the presentations and discussions were policy-
relevant, each panel commenced with a speaker from EPA 
providing an overview of the current policy landscape . The 
speakers who followed, drawn from academia, industry, and 
the nonprofit sector, then focused on specific opportunities 
and challenges presented by the CAA .2
This short Article highlights the major points raised dur-
ing the day-long conference and seeks to provide insight into 
the factors EPA will need to consider as it moves forward 
with crafting GHG regulations under the CAA . We by no 
means claim to provide a full catalogue of the insights and 
discussion of the different panels but instead try to crystallize 
the key messages of the day as perceived by the authors .
1 . 42 U .S .C . §§7401-7671q, ELR Stat . CAA §§101-618 .
2 . An online video of the conference can be viewed at http://www .nicholas .duke .
edu/institute/clean .air .2009 .html The conference also included a background 
paper . Brigham Daniels, Regulating Climate: What Role for the Clean 
Air Act? A Primer, available at http://www .nicholas .duke .edu/institute/clean .
air .2009 .html . Some of the content of the unpublished background paper is 
included in this Article .
I. The Endangerment Finding
At the time of the conference, there was much speculation 
over whether EPA would even try to use the CAA to regu-
late GHGs . Since the conference, however, EPA has put all 
speculation to rest . On April 17, the Agency issued a pro-
posed endangerment finding .3 In many respects, an endan-
germent finding provides the gateway to regulation under 
the CAA . Though not yet finalized, the finding concludes 
that the current and projected concentrations of GHGs in 
the atmosphere threaten the public health and welfare of cur-
rent and future generations .4 The finding focuses on the six 
main GHGs: carbon dioxide (CO2); methane (CH4); nitrous 
oxide (N2O); hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs); perfluorocarbons 
(PFCs); and sulfur hexafluoride (SF6) .
EPA’s proposal was made pursuant to §202 of the CAA, 
which requires EPA to make an endangerment finding prior 
to regulating automobile emissions .5 It seems reasonable that 
EPA looked to §202 because EPA needed to respond to the 
U .S . Supreme Court’s landmark ruling of Massachusetts v. 
EPA6 that mandated the Agency either to make an endan-
germent finding under that section of the CAA or provide a 
valid reason to decline to do so .
The need to respond to Massachusetts, however, may have 
not been the only reason for EPA’s reliance on §202 . While 
EPA commenced with §202, similarly structured endan-
germent finding requirements are found in other sections 
of the CAA . It seems likely, for example, that the Agency 
could have equally made an endangerment finding under 
§108 (the first step to triggering a GHG national ambient 
air quality standard (NAAQS)),7 or under §111 (triggering 
new source performance standards) .8 As a number of experts 
at the conference noted, the automobile regulatory structure 
3 . Proposed Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse 
Gases Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed . Reg . 18886 (Apr . 
24, 2009) .
4 . Id. at 18895-96 .
5 . Id. at 18887-88 .
6 . 549 U .S . 497, 37 ELR 20075 (2007) .
7 . 42 U .S .C . §7408(a)(1)(A) (2008) .
8 . 42 U .S .C . §7411(b)(1)(A) (2008) .
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under §202 is the most straightforward and sensible of all 
the tools in the CAA toolbox . Section 202 imposes a tech-
nology standard on newly manufactured vehicles . Even for 
the participants who largely favored a GHG cap-and-trade 
system, for example, many of these still believed that plac-
ing technology standards on new cars was the best way to 
deal with the transportation sector . Indeed, it is telling that 
many states have embraced this approach in crafting their 
own GHG regulatory programs . In fact, the coalition of 
states who brought suit against EPA in Massachusetts sought 
permission to deal with vehicle emissions precisely in this 
manner . Hence, the choice to make the finding under §202 
may also represent a pragmatic approach to move forward .9
The endangerment finding under §202 puts to rest many 
of the questions raised by participants of the conference with 
regards to if and how the Obama Administration would 
use the mobile provisions of the CAA to regulate GHGs, 
particularly in light of recent developments regarding fuel 
efficiency standards .10 The endangerment finding, however, 
makes even more relevant the other panel discussions, since 
the finding may well set in motion—or at least open the 
door to—other less intuitive CAA regulations . The finding 
has relevance to three broad CAA programs: NAAQS/state 
implementation plans (SIPs) found in §108; the new source 
performance standards (NSPS) found in §111; and the pre-
vention of significant deterioration (PSD) preconstruction 
permits found in §165 . We discuss some of the major find-
ings relating to all three of these programs below .
II. GHGs and the NAAQS Program
In simple terms, the CAA tackles common air pollutants by 
having EPA identify so-called criteria air pollutants and then 
set NAAQS for the nation’s air .11 Given its central role in the 
CAA, it is interesting to note that there was little enthusiasm 
for using NAAQS to address climate change . Indeed, most 
speakers at the conference argued that, if at all possible, EPA 
should avoid using the NAAQS program . This caution was 
particularly interesting since there has been some speculation 
9 . Assuming one were to use the CAA to regulate climate, it is important to 
note that while §202 seems like the most prudent place to start, this is not 
to say that making an endangerment finding under §202 will not trigger one 
or more other similarly worded endangerment findings found in the CAA . In 
fact, presumably it will . This is one of the chief risks of unleashing the CAA 
on a pollutant like GHGs that are prevalent in all or virtually all sectors of the 
economy . We discuss this point in greater detail below .
10 . In a related development, on May 19, 2009, President Barack Obama an-
nounced a collaboration between EPA, the U .S . Department of Transporta-
tion (DOT), the world’s largest automakers, the United Auto Workers, envi-
ronmental groups, the state of California, and other states . He went further, 
announcing that EPA will use its authority under the CAA to set the first ever 
federal emissions standards for GHGs . And, in tandem, the DOT’s National 
Highway Traffic Safety Administration will propose related fuel economy stan-
dards under the Energy Policy and Conservation Act . The coordinated ap-
proach will allow automakers to build a single national light-duty fleet by 2030 
with 19% lower GHG emissions than those of today’s fleet . Fact Sheet: EPA 
Will Propose Historic Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards for Light-Duty 
Vehicles (May 2009), available at http://www .epa .gov/otaq/climate/regula-
tions .htm .
11 . 42 U .S .C . §7408 (2008) .
that EPA could use the NAAQS/SIP program to create a cap-
and-trade program under this section .12
Whether or not EPA even has the discretion to refrain 
from using the NAAQS program to address GHGs, however, 
remains a matter of contention . It may be that once EPA 
has made an endangerment finding, it must issue a NAAQS . 
Whether or not it has discretion hinges on language found in 
CAA §108(a)(1)(C), which says EPA shall issue NAAQS for 
any air pollutant not regulated by the 1970 CAA for which 
EPA “plans” to issue air quality criteria under the NAAQS 
program .13 At first blush, this seems to create breathing 
room for the Agency—EPA can avoid issuing NAAQS for 
GHGs simply by asserting that it has no plans to do so . But 
this reading contradicts the holding of an earlier precedent, 
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train,14 which pro-
vides EPA no discretion to opt out of issuing NAAQS in the 
face of an endangerment finding . Speakers also noted that 
a decision against issuing NAAQS appears to fly in the face 
of the Court’s direction in Massachusetts that the Agency 
not hide behind policy considerations in deciding whether 
to proceed .15
Whatever the legal requirements, however, many of the 
conference speakers identified both specific and significant 
policy arguments against using NAAQS to address GHGs . 
The following paragraphs set out the range of their concerns .
First, the scale of the GHG problem and the scale of the 
NAAQS/SIP structure are a poor fit . GHGs are a global 
pollutant . In terms of the net effect on the environment, it 
makes little difference whether an emission comes from Dur-
ham, North Carolina; Houston, Texas; or Bangalore, India . 
Yet, the very structure of the NAAQS/SIP program assumes 
both that it makes sense for the nation to set a national air 
quality standard and that states have the power to improve 
air quality within their airsheds . GHG levels are virtually 
the same worldwide, and because GHGs spread uniformly in 
the upper reaches of the earth’s atmosphere, a single state has 
little power to reduce GHGs in the state’s airshed, no matter 
how draconian the regulation .
Second, given the presence of fossil fuels in every corner 
of the economy, getting the right balance between costs and 
benefits of any particular GHG limitation is difficult, to say 
the least . Under the NAAQS program, however, it is even 
more difficult because in setting the NAAQS, EPA is explic-
itly forbidden from considering costs .16 As a political matter, 
EPA stating that it cannot pay attention to the impacts of 
NAAQS on the struggling American economy will not play 
well in Tallahassee, Toledo, or Topeka .
Third, GHG emissions are long-lived, staying in the 
atmosphere for decades or even centuries . EPA would need 
12 . See, e.g., Regulating Greenhouse Gas Emissions Under the Clean Air Act, 73 
Fed . Reg . 44353, 44482 (July 11, 2008) .
13 . 42 U .S .C . §7408 (2008) .
14 . 545 F .2d 320, 7 ELR 20004 (2d Cir . 1976) . EPA, in fact, adopted this read-
ing of Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train on the public record but 
argued that it is possible that courts may rethink this interpretation of §108 .
15 . EPA might distinguish Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train by ar-
guing that it does not “plan” to use the NAAQS program but does “plan” on 
using another section of the CAA .
16 . 42 U .S .C . §7409 (2008) .
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to find a way to treat the emissions already in the atmosphere 
rationally as well as grappling with creating annual pollu-
tion budgets that recognize that emissions from this year are 
going to be on the books for a long time going forward .
Fourth, the bedrock of the NAAQS/SIP program—coop-
erative federalism—does not match well with global pollut-
ants . Since the air above the Black Hills of South Dakota 
has the same GHG concentrations as the air above the coal 
plants in Ohio, should both states be required to write SIPs 
that achieve the same level of GHG reductions?17 Alterna-
tively, should EPA allocate GHG reduction requirements 
according to each state’s ability to achieve emissions, with the 
greatest burden falling on the states that can most quickly or 
cheaply achieve reductions? And, given that emissions in sig-
nificant part are a reflection of economic activity and growth, 
how should EPA factor that into the equation? For example, 
should industrial states have a lower regulatory burden than 
rural states, i .e ., to allow them to continue to promote eco-
nomic growth? Similarly, what weight should EPA put on the 
current population, forecasted population growth, historic 
emissions, and each state’s need for economic growth?
Addressing these concerns will, no doubt, require cre-
ative thinking . One conference participant, for example, 
suggested that EPA could set a reduction goal by setting a 
NAAQS, e .g ., a 50% reduction compared to 2005 levels by 
2050, and then allocate wedges of that reduction trajectory 
to each state . While EPA could rely on various factors in 
doing so, e .g ., state gross domestic product, state population, 
or some combination of the two, coming up with a plan that 
EPA deems sensible does little in reducing the political fire-
storm that may erupt when it becomes clear which states are 
political winners and losers due to EPA’s calculus .
Fifth, some have argued that EPA could acknowledge 
the global nature of GHGs, declare all state SIPs inadequate 
(or advise states not to issue SIPs), and then create a federal 
implementation program along the lines of a mandatory 
cap-and-trade program .18 While there are some questions 
about whether EPA even has the power to forge down this 
road, some at the conference argued that this approach was 
politically infeasible since it contradicted the cooperative 
federalism spirit that for nearly three decades has politically 
sustained the NAAQS/SIP program .
Perhaps the most practical observation in the context of 
NAAQS came in the context of timing . Even if EPA decides 
to issue NAAQS for GHGs (or a court orders it to do so), 
many at the conference argued that conservatively it would 
take at least a decade, if not longer, before these regulations 
entered into force, even if the Agency tried to rush the pro-
17 . This is generally the approach taken by EPA for other air pollutants since the 
air pollutant concentration in a state’s airshed is usually caused by the state’s 
own emissions . When emissions are caused by another state, the affected state 
can attempt to force the first state to reduce its emissions by enforcing §110 
of the CAA, which provides that no state shall “contribute significantly” to 
another state’s nonattainment . Section 110, however, has been the subject of 
much debate and litigation .
18 . Jonathan B . Weiner, Think Globally, Act Globally: The Limits of Local Climate 
Policies, 155 U . Pa . L . Rev . 1961-79 (2007) .
cess .19 As a result, the threat of NAAQS regulation is not 
imminent . Thus, while the NAAQS program may be head-
ing for a collision with GHGs, if at all, the collision will play 
out in slow-motion for the next few years, giving Congress 
plenty of time to act .
III. GHGs and the NSPS Program
The NSPS program takes a technology-based approach, 
authorizing EPA to require a stationary source, such as a 
petroleum refinery, to install a particular technology or 
decrease its emissions to levels that are the functional equiv-
alent of installing such a technology .20 The NSPS program 
does not apply to all stationary sources, but rather only to 
new or modified sources that “contribute significantly” to 
air pollution that “endangers public health or welfare .”21 
Importantly, in the event that EPA has not promulgated a 
NAAQS program, the NSPS program would also apply to 
existing sources .22
While speakers were generally critical of the NAAQS pro-
gram, they were more optimistic about the returns of EPA 
employing the NSPS approach .23 Some suggested the flexibil-
ity under this program constituted a major benefit because it 
allowed EPA to craft GHG regulation with particular sectors 
in mind, deciding not only which subsectors of the economy 
to tackle first but also how stringently to regulate them .24 In 
theory, this would allow EPA to go slowly and methodically . 
As one panelist explained, in the short term EPA could, for 
example, set NSPS at modest levels, review them, and poten-
tially increase them as new emission reduction technologies 
became available . Participants saw that another advantage of 
the NSPS program is that it, unlike the NAAQS program, 
allows EPA to consider costs and take into account the poten-
tial drag of regulations on the economy .25
Yet, endorsement of the NSPS program did come with 
reservations . One of the expressed concerns to this approach 
related to the potential of uneven regulation across the econ-
omy . Even if EPA only focused on major emitters, it will 
take a long time for EPA to work its way through the myriad 
sources of GHGs . By necessity, some sectors will likely face 
NSPS regulations long before others . Others argued that a 
level playing field that addresses multiple sources at once—
such as cap-and-trade programs—is a more sensible and less 
politically charged way to proceed than cherry-picking vari-
ous targets across the economy and having them bear bur-
dens before other sectors . Still others voiced concern that the 
lag time for using NSPS was just too long .
19 . Some of EPA’s major procedural steps include crafting what is known as a 
scientific document setting out the rationale of the NAAQS, walking through 
the rulemaking process, providing regulatory guidance to the states, providing 
time for states to generate SIPs, and providing time for various sources 
to comply .
20 . 42 U .S .C . §7411 (2009) .
21 . Id.
22 . Id.
23 . One speaker from EPA pointed out that most of the comments to EPA’s ad-
vanced notice that favored CAA GHG regulation using the NSPS program .
24 . 73 Fed . Reg . at 44486-87 .
25 . Id. at 44486 .
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Discussion also turned to whether an NSPS approach 
provided an obvious pathway to a market-based regulation, 
such as a cap-and-trade program . Some argued that a cre-
ative reading of the CAA could open this door . In fact, EPA’s 
advance notice suggests that the NSPS program may permit 
EPA to pursue a cap-and-trade system by defining very broad 
industry categories and then permitting some sort of trading 
within these categories .26 It is uncertain, however, whether 
this reading of the CAA is permissible or whether such a 
program would work .27
IV. GHGs and the PSD Program
The PSD program requires preconstruction permits for any 
new or modified “major” stationary sources .28 This require-
ment is applicable so long as the source at issue emits pol-
lutants “subject to regulation under the act .”29 This would 
apply to pollutants regulated under various sections of the 
CAA, including §§108 (NSPS) and 111 (NAAQS/SIP) . Such 
a permit must contain emissions limitations based on a tech-
nology standard referred to as the best available control tech-
nology for each pollutant subject to regulation . This review is 
more complex and often more demanding in the event that 
the major stationary source emits a pollutant that is covered 
by a NAAQS, particularly where the source is found within 
a nonattainment area .30
A source is defined as a major stationary source if: (i) it is 
one of the sources explicitly listed in the statute and it emits 
more than 100 tons of any pollutant regulated under the 
CAA; or (ii) it emits more than 250 tons of any pollutant 
regulated under the CAA . Given that some GHGs (espe-
cially CO2) are frequently emitted in much larger amounts 
than traditional pollutants, the 100- and 250-ton thresholds 
are easily crossed . While one conference participant argued 
that the regulation of GHGs under the CAA would not trig-
ger the PSD program, citing evidence in the CAA that Con-
gress only intended the PSD program to apply to traditional 
pollutants, most other conference participants shared the 
concern that any regulation of GHGs by the CAA would 
26 . Id. at 44490 .
27 . The permissibility of using NSPS to create a cap-and-trade program turns on 
the definition of “standard of performance .” CAA §111(a) defines “standard of 
performance” as a “standard for emissions .” CAA §302 then defines “emission 
standard” as a requirement “which limits the quantity, rate, or concentration 
of emissions of air pollutants on a continuous basis .” As one of the confer-
ence speakers argued, the §302 language refers to a plant-specific emission 
measure (like a scrubber) and thereby precludes a cap-and-trade program 
wherein sources could buy emission allowances to avoid making any reduc-
tions . Others, however, have argued that the language of §§111(a) and 302 
is consistent with a cap-and-trade program . See, e.g., Inimai M . Chettiar & 
Jason A . Schwartz, The Road Ahead: EPA’s Options and Obligations for Regu-
lating Greenhouse Gases, Institute for Policy Integrity, NYU School of Law, 
Report No . 3, April 2009, at 86-88, available at http://www .law .nyu .edu/
news/IPI_REPORT_GREENHOUSE_GASES. EPA’s only previous attempt 
to create a cap-and-trade program under the NSPS program was the Clean Air 
Mercury Rule (CAMR) . CAMR was vacated by the U .S . Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia (D .C .) Circuit for reasons unrelated to EPA’s author-
ity to create such a cap-and-trade program in New Jersey v. EPA, 517 F .3d . 574, 
38 ELR 20046 (D .C . Cir . 2008) .
28 . 42 U .S .C . §7475 (2009) .
29 . 42 U .S .C . §7479 (2009) .
30 . 73 Fed . Reg . 44486-87 .
push many emitters into the category of major stationary 
sources for the first time—meaning the PSD program and 
the expense of permitting could penetrate far deeper into the 
economy, potentially applying to everything from indoor 
shopping malls to large residential buildings .31
Assuming that the PSD program were to apply, confer-
ence participants from industry were particularly concerned 
about the effect of PSD permitting on modified sources of 
GHGs . A major modification triggering PSD permitting 
is “a physical change in or change in the method of opera-
tion of a major stationary source that would result in a sig-
nificant net emissions increase of any” regulated pollutant .32 
The concern was that such permitting requirements would 
discourage companies from cleaning up or even maintain-
ing existing plants (even through innovative technologies) 
because the companies would fear triggering PSD’s burden-
some and costly requirements .33
V. Limitations of the CAA in Addressing 
Climate
Given that Congress crafted the CAA as a response to local 
and regional air pollution, it is not surprising that crafting a 
sensible climate policy for the CAA feels a bit like jamming 
a square peg into a round hole . Many argued that the fit is so 
poor that Congress will have no choice but to act . Yet, until 
Congress or the courts say otherwise, the CAA is the law 
under which we will regulate climate change .
The imperfection of the CAA as a tool to address the full 
climate challenge was drawn out throughout the conference . 
Legal experts and advocates representing the full range of 
interests and perspectives participated, and seemingly to a 
man or woman, they agreed that the CAA did not provide an 
appropriate mechanism to address the global and pervasive 
challenge of climate change . While some panelists argued 
that there was a role for CAA regulation—particularly under 
Title II and the NSPS program—none believed that those 
mechanisms would suffice . For the most overarching pro-
31 . Id. at 44499, stating
we estimate that if CO2 becomes a regulated NSR pollutant (either 
as an individual GHG or as a group of GHGs), the number of PSD 
permits required to be issued each year would increase by more than 
a factor of 10 (i .e ., more than 2000-3000 permits per year), unless 
action were taken to limit the scope of the PSD program under one 
or more of the legal theories described below . The additional permits 
would generally be issued to smaller industrial sources, as well as large 
office and residential buildings, hotels, large retail establishments, and 
similar facilities .
 For a pessimistic view of how troubling this might actually be, see Portia M .E . 
Mills & Mark P . Mills, A Regulatory Burden: The Compliance Dimen-
sion of Regulating CO2 as a Pollutant (2008), available at http://www .
uschamber .com/assets/env/regulatory_burden0809 .pdf .
32 . 40 C .F .R . §51 .166(b)(2)(i) . As the Court held in Environmental Defense v. 
Duke Energy Corp., 549 U .S . 561, 37 ELR 20076 (2007), the definition of 
“modification” for PSD purposes is not the same as the definition for NSPS 
purposes, which is any change that increases the hourly rate of emissions from 
a facility .
33 . Industry has long been making this argument for traditional pollutants as well . 
See, e.g., U .S . EPA, New Source Review: Report to the President, (June 
2002), available at http://www .epa .gov/nsr/documents/nsr_report_to_presi-
dent .pdf .
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gram of the CAA—the NAAQS program—there was seri-
ous pushback on the idea of using it to address GHGs .
At the same time, the conference participants expressed 
a near collective belief that, once the endangerment finding 
was made, EPA would not have the discretion to forego all 
CAA regulation . Many speculated that EPA was one lawsuit 
from having to move forward on all fronts . Thus, through-
out the day, there remained an undercurrent of discussion 
of climate legislation, with the suggestion that new action 
by Congress—action specifically tailored to the challenge 
of global warming—would provide a far better regulatory 
approach to the problem .
In sum, EPA’s authority under the CAA stands as the 
most obvious and well-established regulatory requirement 
for the federal government to address climate change . While 
it is imperfect, it may be the proverbial gun in the hand of the 
executive branch, pointing at itself and the country at large, 
with which EPA can ask Congress to please legislate before it 
is forced to shoot .
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